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ISOLATED AND POLITICIZED: THE NLRB'S
UNCERTAIN FUTURE
James J. Brudneyt

INTRODUCTION

For an agency that presides over a dwindling domain, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") has generated

a fair amount of heat in recent times.1 Since the start of 2004, the
Board has issued a remarkable series of decisions weakening the
rights of workers to engage in organizing and collective bargaining

under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 2 These
decisions invariably have been authored by appointees of President

Bush and typically have been accompanied by an angry or despairing
dissent. In the aggregate, they have limited the Act's coverage over
numerous distinct groups of employees,3 restricted the basic right of

t Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law. I presented an earlier version of this article at the annual meeting of the
International Association of the Editors of the Journals of Labor Law, and I am grateful to
participants for their insights. Philip Bryden, Victor Brudney, Cindy Estlund, Fred Feinstein,
Peter Shane, and Steven Willborn provided valuable comments and suggestions. Katie
Downing, Rebecca Fitzthum, and Sara Sampson furnished excellent research assistance. Amy
Beaudreault ably prepared the manuscript. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law
and its Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies each contributed generous financial
support.
1. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board's Critics See a Bias Against Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at A-20; Editorial, Labor Pains, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 17, 2005, at 7; John
Herzfeld, AFL-CIO Counsel, Management Attorney Both Fault New Directions of Labor Board,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-7 (Jan. 29, 2005); Kenneth R. Dolin, Estreicher Urges Reforms to
Address NLRB "Policy Oscillation," ABA Labor and Employment Law 2 (Spring 2005).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). I use the term "NLRA" to refer to the original 1935
statute as amended at various later dates. I also refer to the 1935 enactment as the Wagner Act,
and the 1947 amendments as the Taft-Hartley Act.
3. See, e.g., Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (2004) (holding that graduate assistants
are not "employees" because their relationship to their employer is primarily educational);
Brevard Achievement Center, 342 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (2004) (holding that disabled workers
employed as janitors are not "employees" because their relationship to their employer is
primarily rehabilitative); Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (2004) (holding that
"leased" employees (employed by user employer and supplier employer) and "regular"
employees (employed solely by user employer) may not be included in same unit for purposes of
collective bargaining if user employer objects, even when the two groups of employees share a
community of interest).
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workers to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of...
mutual aid or protection,"4 and substantially augmented the ability of
employers to interfere with or intimidate employees who seek to
organize5 or to bargain collectively. 6 Many of the Board's decisions
have overruled or disregarded prior precedent.7 The Board also has
invited review in two additional cases that suggest it may be prepared
to abandon its decades-old commitment to principles of voluntary
recognition.!

4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). See, e.g., Waters of Orchard Park, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (2004)
(holding that nursing home employees fired for calling state patient care hotline to report
excessive heat were engaged in activity that was "concerted" but not "protected" because
intended to protect patients rather than workers); Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45
(2004) (holding that employee who solicited coworker to testify before state agency in support of
her sexual harassment complaint was engaged in activity that was "concerted" but not
"protected" because intended to advance her own case and not the position of others with
similar problems); IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2004) (holding that non-union employees
have no right to be accompanied by a fellow employee when required to meet with employer in
setting that may result in discipline or discharge).
5. See, e.g., Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (2004) (holding that employer's threats
to close its facility in the event employees vote for union representation are not presumed to be
disseminated throughout the bargaining unit); Washington Fruit & Produce Co., 343 N.L.R.B.
No. 125 at 8 (2004) (holding that employer's 'Excelsior' list of employee names and addresses
that gave incorrect addresses for 87 employees did not warrant setting aside election results in
which union lost by 40 votes and union never was able to locate correct addresses for 28 of the 87
erroneous addresses distributed by employer); Delta Brands, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (2005)
(holding that employer's maintenance of a plainly unlawful no-solicitation policy in an employee
handbook is not itself sufficient grounds to set aside an election); Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345
N.L.R.B. No. 41 (2005) (holding that managers who closely observed conversations among offduty employees about union authorization cards, and then interrupted to offer employer's
position against union, were not engaged in coercive conduct or unlawful surveillance).
6. See, e.g., AMF Trucking & Warehouse, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (2004) (holding that
employer's asserted refusal to agree to wage increases because firm was "weaker than it was in
previous years" and "fighting to keep the business alive" does not constitute a claim of inability
to pay and therefore does not trigger obligation to furnish financial information to union as part
of good faith bargaining); Essex Valley Visiting Nurses Assn., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (2004)
(holding that while employer's unilateral transfer of nurses from administrative to field positions
was unlawful bad faith bargaining, employer's subsequent firing of the transferred nurses on the
grounds that they were unqualified for their new positions was lawful); Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2004) (holding that employer's "facially neutral" work
rules prohibiting use of "abusive and profane language," "harassment of other employees ... in
any way" and "verbally, mentally, or physically abusing" a fellow employee or supervisor were
not unlawful).
7. See, e.g., Brown University and Oakwood Care Center,supra note 3; IBM Corp., supra
note 4; Crown Bolt and Delta Brands,supra note 5; Lutheran Heritage,supra note 6.
8. See NLRB Order Granting Review in Dana Corp and Metaldyne Corp., Daily Lab Rep.
(BNA) at E-1 (June 9, 2004) (questioning the presumptive validity of employer decision to
recognize union through card check rather than Board-supervised election); Shaw's
Supermarket, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (2004) (questioning the continuing validity and application
of accretion doctrine set forth in Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1975)).
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This is hardly the first time that the Board has drawn sharp
criticism for being perceived as tilting too far toward management or

union interests. Attacks on Board objectivity were made as early as
19399 and have continued periodically for more than half a century. 10
Still, the most recent pattern of pro-management decisions is
sufficiently striking to warrant further exploration of the Board's role
in implementing and developing labor relations policy.
This Article examines how the NLRB has managed to remain
unusually detached or isolated in its decision-making even as it has

come to operate in an openly partisan manner. There is a certain
paradoxical quality to the coexistence of these two descriptors for
Board conduct: isolation in agency performance suggests a neutral
separation from the political process whereas politicization implies a
close connection to the elected branches. The explanation for this
odd pairing involves a number of factors, both institutional and
political, some of which have been initiated by the Board while others
are beyond its control. The bottom line is an agency strangely

removed from national conversations about the future of employeremployee relations.
The Board's isolation and politicization have left it in an
As the agency principally charged with
unfortunate position.
overseeing the development and retention of collective bargaining
relationships, it seems incapable of halting or even responding to the
movement away from such relationships. The dramatically reduced
role played by unions and collective bargaining in the U.S. private
economy is hardly attributable solely or even primarily to the
workings of the legal regime. At the same time, the Board in its

9. See, e.g., ProposedAmendments to the National Labor Relations Act: Hearings Before
the House Committee on Labor, 76th Cong., 47-55 (1939) (statement of Rep. Anderson); id. at
105-13 (statement of Rep. Ford). See generally Verbatim Record of the Proceedingsof the House
Committee Investigating the Labor Board and Wagner Act (2 vols., Dec. 11, 1939 to Feb. 6 1940)
(BNA 1940).
10. See, e.g., Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Labor Relations Board of the House Committee
on Education and Labor 87th Cong., 516-17 (1961) (statement of Elliot Bredhoff, General
Counsel, United Steel Workers of America); id. at 149-57 (statement of William Pollock,
General President, Textile Workers Union of America); AFL-CIO Lawyers Coordinating
Committee, The Labor Law Exchange: The Dotson Board's Decisions, 1983-85 (1985)
[hereinafter Report on Dotson Board]; The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Trends and
Their Implications: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 11-15 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
House Hearing] (statement of Roger King, member, Society for Human Resource
Management); Kirk Victor, Management Lashes Out at NLRB, 27 NAT'L J. 2163 (Sept. 2, 1995);
Michael D. Goldhaber, Is the NLRB in a Pro-LaborMood?, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 9, 2000 at B-1.
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isolated and politicized status has failed to contribute to-and may
well have inhibited-a constructive response to these developments.
Part I considers the factors behind the NLRB's isolation and
related lack of accountability.
Part II describes the increased
politicization of Board membership and its special impact in a period
of Republican ascendancy. Part III discusses how these two features
(isolation and politicization), in concert with the depleted state of the
union movement, have contributed to the agency's current troubled
status and its seemingly bleak prospects.
I.

THE ISOLATING AUTONOMY OF BOARD DECISIONMAKING

A.

Two Sides of Autonomy

Autonomous tendencies in regulatory decision-making need not
be a source of concern. Administrative agencies typically are charged
with implementation and enforcement of complex statutory schemes
initially formulated years or decades earlier. In exercising such
authority, they seek to be both faithful to the regulatory policies
enacted by prior Congresses and responsive to the legal, economic,
and political changes that have altered the nature of their regulated
marketplace.
When accommodating these two roles-fidelity to original
purposes and sensitivity to changed circumstances -agencies may well
engage in a process of updating statutory meaning as part of their
policymaking role.1' Scholars have recognized that federal agencies
may construe statutory text "dynamically" when acting as
adjudicators, rulemakers, or advocates in the federal courts.12 The
aspiration underlying an agency's dynamic interpretive approach is to
make the regulatory scheme as faithful to legislative policy as possible
over time and in light of unforeseeable events.13
With respect to the Board, however, agency autonomy has lately
been associated not with making the NLRA effective or adaptable to
changed circumstances but rather with the Act's diminished relevance
or applicability to the modern American workplace.
A recent
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Court in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 678-718
(1987) (discussing role of Comptroller of Currency and Federal Reserve Board in updating
banking laws enacted in 1930s); Jerry Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation,
http://www.bepress.comlils/iss3/art9, at 14-15, 23 (describing agencies as prudently synthesizing
the past and the present).
12. See Edward L. Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State,
http://www.bepress.com/ils/lss3/art2 at 2, 10; Mashaw, supra note 11, at 15.
13. See Mashaw, supra note 11, at 21.
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national study of worker attitudes estimated that over half of all
private sector employees would opt for union representation if given a
genuinely free chance to do so. 4 Yet, as new groups of workers in the
post-industrial economy have attempted to organize, the Board has

found ways to exclude them from protective coverage.

Decisions

since 2004 have concluded that graduate teaching assistants, disabled

workers employed as janitors, and artists' models are not "employees"
entitled to the Act's protections, 5 and that temporary workers and

regular employees performing side by side may be prohibited from
forming a union together. 6
There is powerful evidence that the American workplace today
features widespread employer practices of lawful and unlawful
resistance to unionization, 7 practices that understandably have led

employees to fear mistreatment or termination if they try to organize
a union." Yet, the Board in a series of rulings has sharply diminished

employees' rights in the pre-election setting, by allowing employers
greater

leeway

when

they

unlawfully

threaten

employees,19

improperly restrict employees' ability to solicit union support, 2° and

14. See Andy Levin, 57 Million U.S. Workers Would Form a Union Tomorrow,
Voice@Work Network (March 30, 2005), http://www.unionvoice.org/aflciovoiceatwork/noticedescription.tcl?newsletterid=1419159 (reporting on recent national poll indicating 53% of
nonunion workers want to form unions). See also RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS,
WHAT WORKERS WANT 89 (1999) (reporting that 44% of private sector employees want to be
represented by a union).
15. See Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42 (2004), Brevard Achievement Center, 342
N.L.R.B. No. 101 (2004), Penn. Acad. of the Fine Arts, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (2004).
16. See Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (2004).
17. See, e.g., International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), International
Labor Standards in the United States: Report for the General Council Review of Trade Policies
of the United States 3 (2004) [hereinafter ICFTU Report for WTO] (reporting that 92% of
employers in contested campaigns force employees to attend closed-door meetings and 78%
subject employees to one-on-one meetings with supervisors).
UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:
WORKERS'

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER

INTERNATIONAL

71-74 (2000) (reporting that employers threaten to close
workplace in 50% of U.S. organizing campaigns); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKERMANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 70 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION
REPORT] (reporting that by 1990, one of fifty union supporters in an election campaign could
expect to be victim of unlawful termination). Charles Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes:
Discriminationfor Union Activity Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 327,
330 (1998) (estimating that by the late 1990s, one of every eighteen workers who participated in
a union organizing campaign was the object of unlawful discrimination).
18. See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra at 17 (reporting that as of 1991, 41% of all
non-union non-managerial employees believe their own employer would fire or otherwise
mistreat them if they campaigned for a union).
19. See Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (2004).
20. See Delta Brands Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (2004). But cf. Harborside Healthcare Inc.,
343 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (2004) (allowing little leeway when employer supervisors attempt to solicit
employees to support union).
HUMAN

RIGHTS STANDARDS
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mislead union organizers through dissemination of incorrect employee
home addresses."
Employers' intense resistance to efforts at unionization also gives
special meaning to the interpretation of what qualifies as concerted
activity "for mutual aid or protection" under section 7 of the Act.
Yet, the Board seems determined to impose a shriveled understanding
of when employees are engaged in "protected activity" under this core
provision. In a spate of recent decisions, the Board has held that
nurses who adhere to state health department requirements that they
report serious risks to patient safety are unprotected,22 as is an
employee who solicits a coworker to testify in support of her sexual
harassment claim against her employer,23 or an employee who
requests assistance from a coworker in an employer disciplinary
proceeding that may result in his termination. 4
The Board's recent performance has elicited sharp disapproval
from legal academics as well as unions.' Far from rendering the Act
as effective as possible in modern circumstances "by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and.., protecting...
workers' ... full freedom of association,, 26 the Board has undermined
a range of employee protections including some that seemed wellestablished under prior decisions. On a broader scale, the labor
movement in the past decade has criticized the Board and its
accompanying legal regime as obstacles to fulfilling the purposes of
the Act. 7 Many unions have adopted a contractually based approach
to organizing: by negotiating directly with employers for neutrality
agreements and voluntary card check recognition, labor organizations
are increasingly abandoning the Board-supervised representation
elections process.' The current Board seems prepared to restrict this

21. See Washington Fruit & Produce Co., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (2004).
22. See Waters of Orchard Park, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (2004).
23. See Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2004).
24. See IBM Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2004).
25. See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (reporting disapproval from several leading labor law
scholars as well as AFL-CIO general counsel); Herzfeld, supra note 1 (reporting concerns
expressed by prominent labor law scholar who also represents management interests in private
practice).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2004) (quoting congressionally formulated "policy of the United
States" under Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act).
27. See, e.g., Remarks by AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney to ABA Labor and
Employment Law Section, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-44 (July 12, 2000); Eric Lekus, Card
Check, Neutrality Accords, Best Way for Unions to Organize, UNITE's Raynor Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), at C-1 (June 4, 2004).
28. See Lekus, supra note 27; James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check
Recognition: Prospectsfor Changing Paradigms,90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824-31 (2005).
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approach as well, having signaled its willingness to reconsider
established precedent supportive of voluntary recognition.

The scope and magnitude of the Board's rulings raise the
question of how the agency can operate in such an apparently
unaccountable fashion. On one level, the Board could be viewed as
"behaving accountably" in that this barrage of decisions arguably
mirrors the intensely anti-union philosophy of a Republican White
House and a combatively conservative Congress. At a deeper level,
however, the Board's ability and willingness to depart so readily from

its own past precedent and the evident purpose of Congresses that
enacted and amended the NLRA have been enhanced by its unusually

isolated status-a status the agency has in part been assigned and in
part helped to construct. This isolation has developed over decades,

influenced by several distinct institutional factors.
B.

FactorsIsolating the NLRB from OtherActors

1.

Congressional Inaction

One important way in which agencies renew their vitality and
contribute to the development of national policy is by being forced to
respond to directives from Congress. The nature of the securities
markets has changed dramatically since the 1930s, and Congress

repeatedly has asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
to take on new responsibilities or relinquish old ones.3"

Similarly,

Congress has frequently requested that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) address new issues as they have arisen in a
dynamically shifting communications industry.3'
Like its sister New Deal era agencies, the NLRB's domain-the
labor-management relations arena-has experienced transformative
shifts and upheavals. There have been substantial changes inter alia in

29. See supra note 8 (describing NLRB orders in Dana, Metaldyne, and Shaw's
Supermarket); NLRB General Counsel Rosenfeld's Report on Unfair Labor PracticeAllegations
Involving Neutrality Agreements, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-1 (Nov. 18, 2004).
30. See, e.g., Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 459 (1968) (regulating stock
tender offers); Securities Act Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 80b-17; Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1, and 80b-4a; Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78a; Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78a; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et. seq.
31. See, e.g., Communications Satellite Act of 1962, codified at scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.; Communications Act Amendment of 1978, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390 et. seq.; Children's
Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 609; Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §
609; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.; Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. §§ 609-610.
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how terms and conditions of employment are defined and structured,32

in the nature of competition within product markets and the service
sector,33 and in the perceived roles that labor-management
cooperation can play in this radically altered workplace. 4 Congress,
however, has made no comprehensive changes in the NLRA since

1959. 35 As a result of this legislative inaction, the Board enjoys neither
a renewed mandate nor additional powers and responsibilities.

Instead, it relies on an aging regulatory structure to monitor and
respond to labor relations realities that could scarcely have been

anticipated sixty or seventy years earlier.
What accounts for this extended period of statutory silence? For
a start, it reflects the inability to enact majority-supported reforms
when a determined and well-organized minority uses congressional
procedures to create impasse.

As Professor Cynthia Estlund has

observed, there have been a number of occasions since the mid 1970s
when Congress tried to amend the Act, in an effort to reduce the

considerable advantages employers enjoy during union campaigns, to
deter rising employer misconduct, and to prohibit certain "lawful"
employer activity that seriously chills organizing and collective
bargaining efforts.36 Each of these legislative proposals would have
augmented and energized Board authority. Each also garnered

32. For instance, safer workplaces, pensions, and family leave have become relatively
standard terms of employment that employees want provided or protected. Congress since 1970
has enacted a series of minimum standards statutes (Occupational Safety and Health Act;
Employee Retirement Income Security Act; Family and Medical Leave Act) in response to
these evolving employee interests.
33. See, e.g., THOMAS I. PALLEY, PLENTY OF NOTHING: THE DOWNSIZING OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM AND THE CASE FOR STRUCTURAL KEYNESIANISM 29-30, 156-75 (1998)
(discussing effects of globalization, deregulation, and free trade policies); DUNLOP COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 17, at 1-14 (discussing inter alia increased globalization of economic life,
impact of technology and deregulation, and links between immigration and terms of
employment).
34. See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17 at 29-42 (discussing new range of
employer-sponsored employee participation plans or committees); Brudney, supra note 28, at
832-40 (discussing labor and management interest in neutrality agreements and card check
recognition).
35. Congress did add amendments in 1974 targeted to the healthcare industry. See Pub. L.
No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). There has been considerable organizing and collective
bargaining activity in the healthcare sector since the mid 1970s, and these new developments are
closely linked to the congressional changes as construed and implemented through Board action.
See generally Stephani M. Hildebrandt, Note, Physicians,Nurses, & Housestaff: The Continuing
Struggle for Collective BargainingRights, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107 (1999); Rhonda FerreroPatten, Comment, Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry: The NLRB and
Rulemaking, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 133 (1991).
36. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1540-41 (2002) (summarizing failed efforts at labor law reform in 1977-78, 1992, and 1994).
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majority support from both houses of Congress, but in the end each
succumbed to the supermajority requirements of the U.S. Senate.37

There is, however, more to the story than the business
community's ability to marshal a determined legislative minority that
can block labor law reform. Congress has remained concerned to
promote a fairer distribution of economic resources through
workplace regulation-a concern that had helped animate the NLRA.
After 1960, though, Congress has addressed this concern through a

barrage of new regulatory enactments that offer rights and protections
to employees on an individual and individually enforceable basis.
Federal statutes assuring employees equal or nondiscriminatory
treatment have established rights for a range of workplace minorities
defined by their status as such.38 Federal laws setting minimum

standards for specific terms and conditions of employment have
effectively preempted firm-based negotiations between management
and labor to determine basic levels of protection. 9 To be sure, these

legislative forays are not incompatible with congressional support for
collective bargaining between private entities. Over several decades,
however, they have become more than just interstitial efforts to
supplement a legal order based on respect for such collective
bargaining.4 ° In that regard, the failure to update the NLRA in a

comprehensive fashion for nearly fifty years contrasts sharply with
Congress's repeated willingness to modify these major individual
rights statutes.41
37. See id. (discussing filibusters that blocked three major legislative efforts); James J.
Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 67, 81-82 (1999) (summarizing
unsuccessful reform efforts in 1992 and 1994). Professor Estlund notes that organized labor also
has made use of supermajority requirements to thwart legislative reform. See id. at 1542
(discussing 1995 Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (TEAM Act) and Republican
Congress's failure to override veto by President Clinton). But as she points out, while unions
need to change the status quo in order to make labor law effective, the business community is
content to block all change and allow unions to wither, largely unprotectible under an outmoded
regulatory regime. Id. at 1543-44.
38. See Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2004); Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2004); 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2004); 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(2004); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2004); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§
2101-2109 (2004).
40. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1569-71 (1996) (discussing how individual rights-based legal regime
supplanted collective bargaining as primary federal mechanism for ordering employment
relations and redistributing economic resources).
41. With respect to Title VII, see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(k)); Civil Rights
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As a regulatory scheme becomes further removed from its
origins, periodic expressions of congressional commitment can be very
important in guiding the quality and direction of agency conduct.
Conversely, extended congressional silence can send a distinctly
cautionary signal. In this instance, decades of Congress's "conscious
inaction" -failure to legislate in the face of widely perceived problems
with the NLRA-seems to have left the Board with a sense that it
should simply persevere on its own to the extent practicable. That
sense presumably has been reinforced by Congress's at best episodic
interest in conducting formal oversight of Board activities."
The Board has not been an entirely passive observer in this
scenario. As the agency charged with implementing and enforcing
legislative protections for the collective bargaining enterprise, it might
have been expected to advert to-if not advocate for-issues in need
of legislative attention. It has not done so. Instead, as identified in
subsequent discussion in this Part, the Board has tended to maintain a
low profile, exercising a subdued form of autonomy rather than
promoting substantively or recognizing procedurally any continuing
need for new policy directives. This unwillingness by an expert
agency to address the shortcomings of the status quo probably
reinforces Congress's tendency to inertia regarding the existing
statutory scheme.
Ultimately, however, the Board is not responsible for what it is
unable to control. Major legislative programs such as the NLRA
cannot indefinitely sustain high levels of public interest and political
attentiveness. Over a period of time, organized supporters shift their
attention to other public issues, regulated entities use superior
resources to help soften public attitudes, and continuing regulatory

Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified in scattered sections
of 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). With respect to the ADEA, see ADEA Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); ADEA
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
42. See Brudney, supra note 40,*at 1593-94 (contrasting meager NLRB oversight in 1980s
with stronger oversight of MSHA, OSHA, and EEOC). Since 1995, there have been more
oversight hearings, especially in the House, but after 2000 a primary focus of House hearings has
been for the Republican majority to criticize union organizing campaigns premised on neutrality
and card check, issues that the Board had done little to address directly. See generally
Compulsory Union Dues and Corporate Campaigns: Hearings on H.R. 4636 Before the
Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 107th Cong.
(2002); Labor Organizing Campaigns: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee
Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 108th Cong. (2004).

HeinOnline -- 26 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y. J. 230 2004-2005

2005]

ISOLATED AND POLITICIZED

presence itself serves to placate public concern. 3

When new

generations of legislators are unwilling or unable to update the
statutory approach, thereby effectively signaling a lack of urgency, the
agency is unlikely to take a leading role.
2.

The Act's Restrictive Right of Access to Federal Courts

A second element contributing to the Board's autonomy and
isolation stems from the absence of a private right of action under the
NLRA. Virtually every major employee rights statute enacted by
Congress accords workers a right of access to federal court on their
own behalf. Employees generally are given the right to sue without
serious restriction,4 4 although in some instances this right may be

eclipsed when the agency brings an appropriate action in court.45 By
contrast, the NLRA places enforcement authority entirely in the
hands of the Board: adjudication is administrative rather than
judicial, and the aggrieved party has very little ability to alter or

contest the General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion. 6
This administrative scheme for enforcing statutory rights reflects
the general orientation of New Deal regulatory policy.47

It also

comports with the historical perception of federal judges as
systematically hostile to workers' interests in unionization and
collective action."

When Congress did amend the NLRA in 1947 to

increase access to federal courts, the impetus came from the business

43. See generally MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 74-95 (1955) (discussing parallel aging processes within government agencies).
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (ADEA); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a) (ERISA).
45. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Fair Labor Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(4) (Family
and Medical Leave Act). One other workplace statute that vests enforcement authority
exclusively in the agency is OSHA, see 29 U.S.C. § 659. Coincidentally or not, the agency's
performance under OSHA also has been heavily criticized and there too the statute has proven
virtually impossible to amend.
46. See NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112,
122-23 (1987) (observing that General Counsel's decision not to issue unfair labor practice
complaint is not subject to judicial review); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2599-2608 (Patrick
Hardin & John Higgins Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001) (discussing general rule that lower federal courts
lack jurisdiction to consider suits seeking to vacate or mandate Board action in connection with
representation or unfair labor practice cases).
47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u (describing SEC investigative and enforcement powers); 47
U.S.C. §§ 203-05, 207-08, 312, 401-07 (describing FCC administrative and enforcement powers).
See generallyPETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 3-6, 10-14 (1982).
48. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 200-05 (1930);
see IRONS, supra note 47, at 13. See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of
Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts (May 20, 2005,
unpublished draft on file with author) (discussing why legislators prefer delegation to agencies
rather than courts when ideological distance between Congress and agency is perceived as
smaller than between Congress and courts).
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community, which wanted to assure that unions, as unincorporated
associations, could be held accountable for their contractual
agreements and also for their participation in illegal secondary
picketing.49 That creation of private rights of action did not, however,
alter the administrative scheme for enforcing employees' rights to
organize or engage in collective bargaining free from employer
misconduct under section 8(a) of the Act.
In more recent decades, of course, private litigation under other
federal workplace laws has expanded the universe of participants
contributing to the reform and updating of employee rights and
employer responsibilities. As illustrated by Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, private actions that allow for attorneys' fees bring
additional institutional players into the larger dialogue about race and
sex discrimination in the workplace." Litigation, often initiated as
part of a national strategy by the plaintiffs' civil rights bar, has on
various occasions pushed the envelope of federal antidiscrimination
policy." These lawsuits, and the reactions of the sophisticated groups
that support or oppose them, also have helped fuel Congress's
continued interest in revisiting and revising the basic regulatory
scheme. Major changes in Title VII have been due at least in part to
the civil rights community's pressure to override certain restrictive
Supreme Court decisions, and the business community's concern to
temper the potential excesses of trial courts and juries when awarding
damages to plaintiffs.52
Even without granting explicit access to federal court for
workers, the NLRA's open-textured statements addressed to
employee rights and employer prohibitions53 can be viewed as

49. See Brudney supra note 28, at 847 (discussing § 301); Estlund, supra note 36, at 1553
n.110 (discussing § 303).
50. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (class action by African
American employees establishes disparate impact right of action); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (private class action establishes access to retroactive seniority for
victims of unlawful discrimination); City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (private class action establishes that gender-based differential in pension
fund contributions is unlawful sex discrimination).
51. To take one example, a series of Supreme Court cases has established the existence and
contours of a fight of action for hostile environment sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
See generally Estlund, supra note 36, at 1556.
52. The 1991 Civil Rights Act (Pub. L. No. 102-166) included provisions overriding
numerous Supreme Court decisions, as well as provisions responsive to employer concerns about
excessive litigation. Interest groups from the civil rights and business communities played
pivotal roles in the lobbying and negotiation processes accompanying enactment. See generally
Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Civil Rights Bill 95-5, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991, at A20.
53. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3); Estlund supra note 36, at 1552.
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allowing for such a proactive role, by in effect inviting agency
arguments that would favor an implied private right of action.
Significantly, the SEC from an early point chose to advocate for such
implied rights of action on behalf of investors under the federal
securities laws. 54 The Commission's theory-regularly advanced in
amicus briefs as well as party submissions-was that the persons
Congress intended to protect under the Act should be able to sue
when their protections were abridged through a breach of the
statute.5 Following the SEC's success in the lower courts over several
decades and ultimately in the Supreme Court in 1964,56 there has been
far more private litigation under the federal securities laws than
litigation initiated by the SEC.57 That altered balance, reflecting in
part the limited resources allocated to the SEC for judicial
enforcement, has contributed substantially to the development of new
policy in the securities law arena.
The Board, however, has never chosen to press for private rights
of action.58 In this regard, Professor Estlund has conducted an
intriguing thought experiment, borrowing from the Title VII
jurisprudence of disparate impact claims and hostile environment
discriminatory harassment litigation to imagine private lawsuits that
allege disparate impact liability or "hostile anti-union environment"
harassment based on the broad antidiscrimination language of section
8(a)(3).' 9 Such private litigation efforts could have led to a more open
and elaborate debate as to what constitutes anti-union conduct. This

54. See Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (implying
action for damages under § 29(b) of 1934 Act); Baird v. Franklin 141 F.2d 238, 239, 242 (2d Cir.
1941) (recognizing implied damages action against stock exchange for failure to enforce
Commission rules authorized under § 6 of 1934 Act); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512,
513-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying private right of action by defrauded investors under Rule lOb5). See generally David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus
Participation: The SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1172-74 (1989).
55. See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 513-14, Ruder, supra note 54, at 1173.
56. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964) (recognizing implied right of
action to enforce SEC proxy rules promulgated under § 14 of 1934 Act). For thoughtful
discussion of the SEC's role during this extended period, see Ruder, supra note 54, at 1174
nn.30-31.
57. See Ruder, supra note 54, at 1174-75 (reporting that from 1961 to 1988, number of
federal court cases filed by SEC rose from roughly 100 to roughly 200 annually, while number of
private lawsuits rose from about 170 to 2,400). Ruder attributes some of the substantial increase
in private litigation to the liberalization of class action procedures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, see
id. at 1175. It seems likely that readier access to class actions could also have benefited workers
seeking remedies under the NLRA.
58. To be sure, had the Board supported an implied right of action on behalf of the Act's
principal beneficiaries, it would have had to address whether employees or unions should be
primary initiators, as well as the prospect that employers might pursue comparable rights of
action under § 8(b) of the Act.
59. See Estlund supra note 36, at 1556-57.
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debate in turn would presumably generate more congressional
interest in adapting the Act to embrace or reject judicial
interpretations inspired by private lawsuits. No such events have
occurred, however, because private rights of action under the NLRA
simply do not exist.
Apart from private litigation, the NLRA language-including its
authorization to pursue remedies-is expansive enough to be viewed
as conferring broad policymaking powers on the Board itself.' As
discussed below, the Board has for the most part elected not to pursue
those powers. Given that unions and employees lack the independent
ability to initiate law reform efforts through the courts, the Board's
decision to forego a dynamic or high profile enforcement role further
contributes to the agency's isolation.
3.

Board Reliance on Adjudication, not Rulemaking

Agencies administering federally enacted regulatory schemes are
expected to perform two basic functions: promulgating norms or
standards of general applicability and resolving specific controversies
that arise under the law. Each function enables an agency to develop,
implement, and enforce policies that are consistent with and promote
the regulatory arrangement established by statute. Congress typically
confers on an agency both rulemaking and adjudicatory authority, and
the NLRB possesses both sets of powers.61 However, over its seventy
year history the Board has chosen to operate virtually exclusively
through adjudication, eschewing its rulemaking authority.62
The Board's decision to rely on case-by-case adjudication as its
means of developing policy presumably reflects a series of strategic
judgments regarding how best to promote the agency's mission. The
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process 63 is often timeconsuming and cumbersome, and thus can interfere with the Board's
ability to respond in a prompt and adequate fashion to rapidly
changing industrial practices. In addition, the binding and uniform

60. See § 10(c) (authorizing Board to exercise broad remedial powers, including "such
affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act"); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978); Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
61. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 416 U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974) (recognizing that Board
has both powers); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-64, 772 (1969) (same).
62. See American Hosp. Assn v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 614 (1991) (upholding Board's one
and only completed rulemaking endeavor). This rulemaking was initiated pursuant to the 1974
health care amendments discussed supra at note 35.
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2004). See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240
(2d Cir. 1977).

HeinOnline -- 26 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y. J. 234 2004-2005

2005]

ISOLATED AND POLITICIZED

effect of formally promulgated rules makes agency adjustment and
adaptation more difficult. The Board may well have perceived that
rulemaking's monolithic approach would leave little room for
Such
geographically inspired variations in judicial response.
variations are likely if not inevitable given the distinct regional
differences that exist regarding public attitudes toward collective
bargaining. Relatedly, there is far more at stake when a rule is
rejected by a federal court than when an adjudicated decision is
reversed. The Board may prefer the incremental adjudication-based
approach to policymaking because it minimizes the risks associated
with judicial review.
As it strives for political respect and legitimacy in the divisive
setting of labor-management relations, the Board may also have
chosen adjudication for more narrowly self-protective reasons. An
adjudicatory approach tends to promote autonomy by shielding
agency policy preferences from the systematic oversight of Congress
or federal courts. Rather than establishing clear standards of conduct
based on articulated reasons that may be challenged by the two other
branches of government, the Board on a range of sensitive topics has
developed some version of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.'
Thoughtful Board insiders have noted that the agency's multi-factor
approaches often yield fairly consistent rule-like outcomes, but do so
through low key fact-based adjudication that attracts less attention
from congressional committees or federal judges.65
Notwithstanding the advantages associated with adjudication, the
Board's strategy has imposed certain costs. Rulemaking allows for
advance planning, enabling an agency to develop a coherent agenda
regarding which problems to address instead of acting exclusively in
response to particular controversies as they arise. Rulemaking also
encourages the collection and analysis of information at a more
complete and sophisticated level.
Agencies that exercise
64. See, e.g., Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988) (setting forth multi-factor test to balance
employer property rights against union organizers' access rights); Sofco, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 159
(1983) (setting forth totality of circumstances approach to assess employer's claim of good faith
doubt as to whether a previously certified union has lost its majority support); Avecor, Inc. 296
N.L.R.B. 727, 748-50 (1989) and Camvac Int'l Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816, 822-23 (1988) (adopting
totality of circumstances approach to whether employer ULPs are serious enough to warrant
bargaining order); NLRB v. Purnell's Pride, Inc., 609 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980) (identifying
eleven factors on which Board relies when deciding if there is appropriate "community of
interest" to approve a requested election unit).
65. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and
the Failure ofJudicial Review, 75 B.U.L. REV. 387, 393-97 (1995) (discussing Board's application
of Jean Country test and good faith doubt approach); Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at
the Labor Board: The Casefor Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.J. 105,
110 (1981) (discussing Board's use of community of interest approach).
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policymaking responsibilities outside the confines of individual
disputes are more likely to initiate or request empirical studies, and to
gather and integrate qualitative materials on their own. By declining
to make use of its rulemaking powers, the Board has missed
opportunities to recognize and respond when studies indicated that its
laboratory conditions doctrine results in an uneven playing field,66 or
that its remedial approach does little to deter employer misconduct. 67
Administrative law scholars have identified the general challenge
of retaining agency vitality "when the evil which gives rise to a
[regulatory] reform has been partially alleviated., 6' The Board's
overly judicialized approach tends to increase that challenge. A focus
on ad hoc decision-making makes it harder for Board members to
engage in long-range planning or to contemplate a more public
dialogue in response to significant changes in the nature of the
workplace.69
Over the past half-century, unions and management have had to
confront numerous problems in a post-industrial setting that were not
addressed or in some instances even foreseen by the Congresses that
enacted the NLRA. The impact of publicly accessible workplaces on
an employer's common law right to exclude union organizers from its
premises, the dramatic growth of professional and service work, the
proliferation of temporary and part-time employment, and the
mobility of capital as it affects the transfer and consolidation of jobs:
these are among the issues that might have benefited from more
systematic, deliberative, and transparent agency consideration. There
is the chance, of course, that higher agency visibility would bring more
opposition, and that Congress or the courts might not accept the

66. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 234-36
(1984) (summarizing results from multiple studies that show substantial adverse impact on
employee free choice from lawful employer speech and conduct); Kate L. Bronfenbrenner,
Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First Contract Campaigns: Implications for
Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 80-82
(Sheldon Friedman et. al. eds., 1994) (reporting adverse impact from captive audience meetings);
Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing
Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 361, 364 (1990) (reporting adverse impact of
supervisors' speaking out against union).
67. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-93 (1983) (discussing inadequacies of Board's
back pay and reinstatement remedies); Terri A. Bethel & Catherine A. Melfi, Judicial
Enforcement of NLRB Bargaining Orders: What Influences the Courts?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
139, 173-75 (1988) (discussing inadequacies of Board's bargaining order remedy).
68.

LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 12 (abridged

student edition 1965).
69.

See JAFFE, supra note 68; WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY

AGENCIES 66 (1967). See generally Estlund, supra note 36, at 1535-36 (summarizing changes in
the economy, the organization of work, and the composition of the workforce).
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Board's rule-based outcomes or might undermine Board efforts at
consistency by imposing partial invalidations.7"

In avoiding these

risks, however, the Board has also compromised its ability to
contribute to national policy on labor-management relations or even
to think in such terms. This posture has frustrated both Congress and
the courts, replacing the possibility of constructive engagement with
the reality of subtle but persistent disdain for an agency that rarely
steps up to the plate.7'

4.

Board Non-Acquiescence

Administrative agencies may at times refuse to conform their
internal policies and practices to seemingly applicable appellate court

precedent. This practice, known as non-acquiescence, derives from
agencies' perception that Congress and the President have by statute

authorized them to perform as the primary interpreters and enforcers
of the relevant national policy. As was true regarding its preference
for adjudication, the NLRB is not alone among federal agencies when

it engages in such non-acquiescence.72
The Board, though,

has been unusually determined

and

years.73

aggressive in pursuing this practice for more than sixty
While
recognizing that an appellate court's judgment must be treated as
controlling in the decision actually announced by that court, the
Board frequently accords such decisions no more deference than is
due to the law of the case.74 Thus, the Board believes it may disregard

not only the precedent of a geographically distinct circuit courtintercircuit non-acquiescence-but also the precedent of the very

70. But cf. American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (sustaining unanimously the
Board's one and only exercise of its rulemaking authority despite strenuous opposition from the
acute health care industry).
71. See, e.g., Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (rejecting Board's multi-factor
test for determining union organizers' access rights); Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v.
NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (criticizing Board's consistent refusal to set forth
reasons or standards justifying its imposition of bargaining orders). See also Joyce Cutler, Gould
Criticizes Congress, Budget Cuts in Last Public Speech as Board Chairman, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at D-19 (July 23, 1998) (reporting that outgoing Board Chairman expressed dismay over
pressure from individual Republican senators and House members regarding pending
adjudications and proposed budget cuts).
72. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (discussing Internal Revenue Service and
Social Security Administration as prominent practitioners).
73. See Acme Indus. Police, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1944).
74. See Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should
Disregardthe "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor
Relations Board,69 N.C.L. REV. 639, 642 (1991).
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circuit that will review the agency's decision-intracircuit nonacquiescence.75
The Board over the years has set forth several reasons for

refusing to acquiesce in appellate court decisions. One is that it is
charged with "[the] uniform and orderly administration of a national
act" and it can best fulfill this congressionally delegated responsibility

by adhering to its own conception of national labor policy, subject
only to Supreme Court decisions that set forth conflicting national
rules or standards.76 In addition, the Board points to its special
expertise in the complex field of industrial relations, and the Supreme

Court at times has recognized that expertise in deferring to Board
interpretations rather than those of the intermediate courts, even
when the Board has been less than consistent in its approach."

Finally, the NLRA's generous venue provisions mean that review of
Board orders is available in many different circuits, and the Board
cannot readily anticipate which circuit court's "law" would be
applicable to an agency decision.7 8
The NLRB's practice of non-acquiescence affects the agency's

conduct internally as well as in its relations with the circuit courts.
This internal non-acquiescence is especially important given that some
97% of Board actions are disposed of at the agency level. 79 The Board
has made clear that a trial examiner's duty is to decide cases based on
the precedent of the Board rather than the courts of appeal.8 ° Even
more important, the General Counsel typically does not consider
appellate court precedent when exercising his very broad discretion as

to whether to initiate an unfair labor practice action.81
75. See White, supra note 74, at 642-43; Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89
IOWA L. REv. 65, 100 (2003).
76. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957). enf. denied 260 F.2d 736 (D.C.
Circuit 1958), affd 361 U.S., 477 (1960). See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 72, at 708.
77. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-96 (1990)
(crediting Board's latest position regarding presumption of union support among permanent
replacements); NLRB v. Trans. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398-404 (1983) (deferring to Board's
new approach to mixed motive discrimination). See generally Estreicher & Revesz, supra note
72, at 708 n.154.
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (providing that an aggrieved party may appeal from, and the
Board may seek enforcement of, an NLRB order in the circuit where the unfair labor practice
arose, or in which the aggrieved party resides or transacts business); White, supra note 74, at
648-49 (observing that for employers or unions that transact business nationwide, all circuits are
available).
79. See 68 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. tbl. 8 (2003); 69 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. tbl. 8 (2004).
80. See Flynn, supranote 65, at 420 and sources cited therein.
81. See id. The Board's reluctance to invoke appellate court precedent has not deterred the
employer community from doing so. It is not unusual for employers to cite circuit court cases in
their post-hearing briefs to trial examiners. Such citations could reflect ignorance of Board
practices, but more likely signal to Board attorneys an intent to pursue reversal of any violations
found by the NLRB.
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The Board's non-acquiescence doctrine stems in part from the
historical circumstances at the time the agency was created. Congress
enacted the NLRA in 1935, during an extended period in which
federal courts were deeply unsympathetic to labor unions.82 Although
the NLRA and the Norris-La Guardia Act8 3 placed important limits
on the power of federal courts, the Board's insistence on its role as
primary articulator of labor relations policy continues to resonate.
Appellate judges in recent decades have been perceived as having
little knowledge about the real world of industrial affairs 84 and a
declining appreciation for the collective rights principles underlying
the NLRA.85 A more persuasive justification for Board nonacquiescence today may be judicial lack of familiarity with labormanagement relations rather than the judicial hostility toward unions
that helped inspire the Act.
Once again, however, a collateral attribute of Board nonacquiescence has been the agency's failure to initiate or contribute to
dialogue among policymakers. The Board's insistence on the
correctness of its position often does not include any effort to confront
or recognize its fundamental policy differences with the appellate
courts. 86 To some extent, the omission may be linked to certain
dubious aspects of Board expertise. As adjudicators, Board members
are invariably trained attorneys but they often lack substantial
experience in the labor relations world.87 Although the General
Counsel's staff in the regions and the administrative law judges who
try cases may have greater exposure to the realities of organizing and
collective bargaining, Board members who must remain
administratively neutral have little or no contract with those
professionals.88 For these among other reasons, the Board tends not
to elaborate on its legal conclusions by reference to what accounts for

82. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & GREENE supra note 48, at 200-05, Bernard D. Meltzer, The
Brandeis-Gompers Debates on "Incorporation"of Labor Unions, 1 THE GREEN BAG 299, 31315 (2d. ser. 1998).
See generally WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY:
POPULISTS,
PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994).

83. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
84. See generally Flynn, supra note 65, at 426 n.164 and sources cited therein.
85. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 988-1020 (1994) (documenting appellate courts'
insensitivity to bargaining-related protections in 1980s and 1990s).
86. See Davies, supra note 75, at 100 n.149 (citing decisions that reflect persistent but
unexplained non-acquiescence). See also Brudney, supra note 85, at 969 n.92 (citing decisions
that reflect Board's capitulation on non-acquiescence, but without explanation).
87. See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET. AL., LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 9
(2d ed. 1999) (discussing how neutral labor relations experts are rarely asked to serve, and even
more rarely do so).
8& See id.
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newly emerging employee attitudes or the changing nature of labormanagement practices.89
Moreover, as an adjudicatory body, the Board must contend with
the potentially supervening role of appellate courts that review agency
findings of fact and conclusions as to statutory meaning. In seeking to
avoid or minimize judicial rejection of its positions, the Board
apparently believes it presents less of a target by simply asserting its
expertise and consequent entitlement to deference, rather than by
explaining and justifying how it applies that expertise with reference
to the circumstances of each case. Some observers have concluded
that the agency's silence as to the reasons for non-acquiescence
reflects primarily an interest in maximizing its success rate on appeal,
as opposed to using its expertise to educate circuit courts or to signal
the Supreme Court about a major policy disagreement.'
Over the years, the NLRB's elliptical or unexplained approach to
asserting its primacy has yielded mixed results. The Supreme Court
has rejected the Board's "expert" positions in several key policy
areas, 91 and appellate courts have eviscerated the agency's stance on
other important matters.' The extent to which Board use of nonacquiescence has enhanced agency success in adjudicative terms
remains open to debate. 93 What is more certain is that nonacquiescence as practiced by the Board has further encouraged the
agency's isolation from other branches of government.

89. See id. at 10 (noting that apart from its own spotty knowledge about labor relations
reality, Board studiously ignores research on this subject by others). Merton C. Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79
YALE L.J. 571, 578 (1970) (discussing Board's lack of information regarding real world of labormanagement relations, and inability to monitor the impact of Board doctrines on industrial
practices).
90. See Flynn, supra note 65, at 425-29; Davies, supra note 75, at 100-01.
91. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (restricting union organizers'
access to employer premises); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (excluding university
faculty from NLRA coverage as managers); NLRB v. Health Care and Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 271
(1994) (excluding licensed practical nurses from NLRA coverage as supervisors).
92. See Brudney, supra note 85, at 969 n.92 (describing appellate courts' rejection of Board
approach to substantive bad faith bargaining); id. at 988-1018 (describing appellate courts'
rejection of Board approach on good faith doubt, initial recognition bargaining orders, and
incumbent restoration bargaining orders).
93. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1020-22 (1990) (reporting that NLRB
decisions reviewed by courts of appeal in 1984-85 were affirmed in toto at a lower rate (75%)
than decisions of other agencies that operated wholly through adjudication, such as Merit
Systems Protection Board (90%), Immigration and Naturalization Service (83%), and Patent
and Trademark Office (81%)).
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C.

The Evolving Consequences of a Stand-Alone Posture

I have tried to demonstrate how various factors-reflecting the
extrinsic realities of politics, the structure of the Act, and internal
agency choices-have contributed to the Board's unusual remoteness
from Congress and the courts, and its consequent minimal role in the
ongoing national dialogue about workplace law and policy. I do not

mean to imply that a minimal role means no role at all: the Board has
not simply abjured interest in the policymaking arena. Indeed, the
agency's preference for adjudication and its penchant for nonacquiescence may be understood in part as an effort to focus on the
Supreme Court as a discussant addressing how best to update the Act.
From this perspective, the Board experienced some triumphs,

perhaps most notably in the 1960s. During that ten year period, the
Court acceded to the Board's positions by conferring protection
against diverse employer efforts to chill group action,94 by requiring
unionized employers to comply with certain collective bargaining
norms, 95 and by authorizing the Board to order bargaining when

extreme employer misconduct undermined a representation election.96
Since 1970, however, Board efforts in the Supreme Court to
vindicate employees' support for organizing and collective bargaining
have been less successful. In aggregate terms, Board findings of

employer liability under section 8(a) were sustained at a far greater
rate in Court cases decided before 1970 than they have been in
subsequent Court decisions. 97 Moreover, on a number of high profile
occasions, the Court has rebuffed Board attempts to maintain or

94. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 587-89, 616-20 (1969) (protecting
against employer threats during campaign); NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964)
(protecting against employer conferral of economic benefits during campaign); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (protecting against employer discriminatory self-help
strategies).
95. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (prohibiting employers from unilaterally
altering working conditions without bargaining); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203 (1964) (requiring employer to bargain with union over decision to subcontract portion
of the work). See also NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (earlier decision requiring
employer to produce information as part of bargaining process).
96. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595-616.
97. See Brudney, supra note 40, at 1573-74 (reporting that Court sustained Board's § 8(a)
findings in fifty of sixty cases (83%) before 1970, but in only twenty-one of thirty-six cases (58%)
from 1970 to 1994). Since 1995, Board determinations of employer liability under § 8(a) have
been supported by the Court in three decisions and rejected by the Court in three others.
Compare NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995) (supporting Board
determination), Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996) (same), and Auciello Iron
Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (same) with Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (rejecting Board determination), NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty.
Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (same), and B.E. & K. Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002)
(same).
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renew the Act's vigor in the contemporary workplace. The agency's
position has been rejected when it sought to make job security a
mandatory subject of bargaining;" to provide non-employee union
organizers with access to employer premises in the service sector;99
and to emphasize the Act's applicability to professional employees
who exercise independent authority in their jobs." ° In several of these
decisions, the Board's isolated status and less than transparent
decision-making approach appear to have contributed to its lack of
01
success. '
The Board, of course, has no influence over the composition of

the Supreme Court. The Court's growing distaste for agency efforts
to protect collective bargaining in a post-industrial economy coincided
with the arrival of a new generation of Justices whose backgrounds
and experiences may well have left them less sympathetic than their
predecessors were to the virtues of unions and the collective
bargaining process." In addition, product and labor markets have
increasingly been shaped by factors beyond the Board's ability to

control, such as deregulation, foreign competition, and the impact of
technology.

These external changes in values and policy priorities likely
deserve more weight than Board internal processes when accounting

for the agency's indifferent track record since 1970. Still, it is worth
98. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
99. See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
100. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), NLRB v. Health Care and Ret. Corp.,
511 U.S. 576 (1994), NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
101. See, e.g., First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 673, 680-86 (criticizing Board's
adjudicatory inconsistency and developing a general rule to preclude mandatory bargaining over
partial closing decisions); Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 535-38 (noting lack of predictability in Board's
multi-factor balancing test governing access for non-employee organizers, and holding that
Board misapprehended earlier Supreme Court decision when developing the test); Yeshiva, 444
U.S. at 678, 691 (refusing to defer to Board's approval of unit of all full-time faculty members, in
part because of agency's conclusory rationales and absence of factual analysis). See also
Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 372-76 (criticizing Board's repeatedly unreasonable application of
its stated "good faith doubt" test, adding that "an agency should not be able to impede judicial
review, and indeed political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as factfinding").
102. Justice Powell, who joined the Court in 1971, is the most prominent example of this new
ideological perspective. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983);
Patternmakers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985); Fall River
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 54-63 (1987) (dissenting opinion). Justice
O'Connor, appointed in 1981, also evidenced relatively little sympathy for workers and unions
engaged in concerted activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841-47
(1984) (dissenting opinion); TransWorld Airlines Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426 (1989); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 409-15 (1996) (dissenting opinion).
The same can be said for Justice Scalia, appointed in 1986. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales and
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998); NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706
(2001); NLRB v. Curtin-Matheson Scientific, Inc. 494 U.S. 775, 801-19 (1990) (dissenting
opinion).
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pondering whether the Board's lack of transparency, perhaps useful
when Justices and executive branch leadership were largely
supportive of the Act, has become a genuine burden as certain judicial
and political centers of gravity have shifted. One might, for instance,
wonder if a less isolated Board would have utilized its expertise and
experience to develop a dialogue involving concerned labor and
business interests, or to engage a Democratically-controlled Congress
as the Court became gradually less receptive to agency interpretations
of congressionally enacted labor policy.
Apart from the impact of external events, the agency's
participation as an institutional actor in national policy conversations
also has been seriously compromised by the increased politicization of
Board membership. As with the Board's unusual isolation, this
politicizing effect has emerged over time; its cumulative impact
deserves attention.
II.

THE POLITICIZATION OF BOARD MEMBERSHIP

The NLRB was established with the understanding that its
members would be nonpartisan and neutral. The Congress that
created the three-member Board in 1935, and the Congress that
expanded it to five members while modifying its structure in 1947,
each had in mind an adjudicative body of nonaligned individuals.
Starting in the 1950s, and accelerating since 1980, Board membership
has come to reflect something quite different-a body composed
principally of experienced management attorneys and lately union
attorneys as well. The result has been an increasingly polarized
Board, which in turn has eroded the agency's role as a neutral and
principled adjudicator.
Professor Joan Flynn has thoughtfully described much of the
transformation in Board membership in a recent law review article;1 3
I rely extensively on her research and analysis in the summary
discussion that follows.
A.

OriginalIntent- Complete Nonalignment

When Congress established the NLRB in 1935, it considered a
tripartite structure consisting of representatives from industry, labor,
and government, but chose instead a "strictly nonpartisan" Board

103. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000).
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composed of "three impartial government members." 1°4 Given that
the Wagner Act created unfair labor practices only on the part of
employers, it is perhaps not surprising that the business community
and its supporters in Congress came to perceive the Board as heavy
05
handed if not biased during its first decade."
Nonetheless, when Congress in 1947 enlarged the NLRB to five
members and separated more formally its adjudicative and
prosecutorial functions,1" there was no suggestion that the expanded
Board should be anything other than nonpartisan and impartial.
Indeed, the House version of the LMRA would have made the Board
overtly bipartisan by limiting the number of members who could
1°
belong to one political party," but the Senate did not go that route 8
and the final version makes no reference to members' party
backgrounds.'0 9 The floor debate on the LMRA also makes clear that
both supporters and opponents expected the Board to be composed of
truly neutral adjudicators. °

104. SEN. COMM. PRINT, COMPARISON OF S.2926 (73D CONG.) and S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) § 3
(1935), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACr
[hereinafter NLRA LEG. HIST.] 1319, 1320. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1363-64 (discussing
revisions that departed from tripartite structure used by National Labor Board under the
National Industrial Recovery Act).
105. See, e.g., Noel Sargent, Can Justice Be Partial?,in THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT: SHOULD IT BE AMENDED 89-90 (Julia Johnson ed., 1940); Malcolm Ross, "The G_ D_
Labor Board", in THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER TEN YEARS 63, 68 (Louis G. Silverburg ed.,
1945). See generally 93 CONG. REC. 3953 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft) reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT [hereinafter LMRA
LEG. HIST.] 1011.
106. Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (increasing Board membership to five
persons); id. at § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 139-40 (formally separating adjudicative and prosecuting
functions).
107. See H.R. 320 as reported, § 3(a) (1947), H.R. 320 as passed House, § 3(a) (1947),
reprinted in,1 LMRA LEG. HIST. at 44, 171 (Board to be composed of three members, not more
than two from the same political party).
108. See S. 1126 as reported, § 3(a) (1947), H.R. 320 as passed by Senate, § 3(a) (1947),
reprinted in 1 LMRA LEG. HIST. at 106, 233-34.
109. See H.R. REP. 80-510, at 36-37 (1947), reprinted in 1 LRMA LEG. HIST. at 540-41
(announcing five-member board as compromise in Conference Report between House version
(three members) and Senate version (seven members), with no language about political party
background of members). Notwithstanding this silence, a tradition has developed of appointing
both Democrats and Republicans to the Board, with the President's party holding a three-to-two
majority of the seats and also the chair. See Matthew M. Bodah, Congress and the National
Labor Relations Board: A Review of the Recent Past,22 J. LAB. RES. 699,700 (2001).
110. See 93 CONG. REC. 4559 (1947) (exchange between Sen. Ball and Sen. Ives), id. at 4561
(statement of Sen. Smith), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEG. HIST. 1201, 1203. The floor debate with
respect to the agency's expanded composition and new structure focused heavily on whether the
Board's backlog was best solved by increased funding or expanded numbers; there was no
mention of Board membership being anything besides neutral. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 3953
(1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), id. at 4158, 6660-61 (statements of Sen. Murray) reprinted in 2
LMRA LEG. HIST. at 1001, 1052, 1576.
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B.

InitialInroads-Moderate Management Orientation

As Professor Flynn points out, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
acted consistently with Congress's intent, drawing their Board
appointees primarily from government service and secondarily from
academia."
Of the fourteen individuals who joined the Board
between 1935 and 11
1952,
only one came from either the labor or
2
management sectors.
President Eisenhower initiated the movement away from a Board
composed exclusively of neutrals.
Eisenhower was the first
Republican to occupy the White House since the Wagner Act
established the NLRB, and two of his early Board appointees had
strong roots in the management sector." 3 During the nearly three
decades from 1953 to 1980, roughly one-half the Board members
appointed by Republican Presidents came from the management
sector.1 4 By contrast, Democratic Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Carter continued to draw all their Board appointments from
government service or academia.1
This decision on the part of Republican Presidents-that
individuals with extensive management backgrounds should serve on
the Board-generated intermittent expressions of concern. With
respect to a controversial management-side nominee in the 1950s,
opponents insisted that favoring appointees from the management
sector conflicted with Congress's vision of the Board as a quasijudicial agency composed entirely of impartial members. 16 At a
subsequent nominee's hearing, opponents emphasized the damage of
a "revolving door" syndrome in which appointees from managementside law firms would return to that practice after a period of Board

111. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1367-68, 1454 (discussing early Board members and their
backgrounds).
112. The exception was Copeland Gray, a 1947 Truman nominee who had been the
industrial relations director of an engineering company but who in fact had virtually no
knowledge of the Act. See id. at 1367 n.26.
113. See id. at 1369 (noting that Guy Farmer (served 1953-55) had spent the eight years
before his nomination at Steptoe & Johnson, where he represented management, and Albert
Beeson (served 1954) was a non-lawyer who directed industrial relations for two different
companies before being nominated).
114. See id. at 1454-55 (noting that three of eight Eisenhower appointees had spent most of
their recent working lives representing management, as had three of five Nixon/Ford
appointees).
115. See id. at 1455 (noting that five of the six Board members appointed by Kennedy,
Johnson, or Carter had government service as their primary occupation while the sixth came
from academia).
116. See id. at 1374-75 & nn.50-53 (discussing Senate opposition's views on Albert Beeson,
expressed in committee report and also in floor statements by various senators).
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service, thereby exacerbating the appearance if not the reality of
bias."7
The prediction that appointees selected from the management
bar would effectively use service on the Board to enhance their
partisan status in subsequent career moves has turned out to be
disturbingly accurate. Nearly four-fifths of the Board appointees who
came directly from management positions returned straight to
management representation upon leaving the Board." 8 As Professor
Flynn observes, "for the vast majority of management lawyers
appointed..., service on the Board has been but a brief hiatus in a
decades-long career on the management side.' 1 9
Supporters of these initial management-side nominees defended
the practice on grounds of both virtue and necessity. They touted the
nominees' expertise in labor law and their familiarity with industrial
relations processes and customs as genuine assets that would enhance
their performance as Board members.120 They also observed that
because such expertise and familiarity were typically acquired in
service to either labor or management interests, it would be almost
impossible to find suitably qualified Board members who did not have
at least some allegedly prejudicial exposures."'
For the initial series of management-side appointees, the
"expertise and familiarity" argument has some intuitive appeal.
Professor Flynn points out that the management lawyers named by
Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford tended to come from
established law firms, having represented unionized clients involved in
mature bargaining relationships.'22 Years of familiarity with the
specialized nature of Board policies and practices may generate a
more neutral respect for the Act's doctrinal scope, at least when that
familiarity is acquired in the context of applying or enforcing
collective bargaining-related norms.

117. See id. at 1379-80 & nn.68-79 (discussing testimony of AFL-CIO president opposing
nomination of Edward Miller in 1970).
118. See id. at 1399 n.165 (noting that as of September 2000, eleven of fourteen Board
members who had come from the management side had returned to the management side upon
leaving the Board). Patterns of post-Board employment for union-side appointees are still quite
preliminary. Of three union-side attorneys appointed by President Clinton in the 1990s, one
returned to the union side, one remains on the Board, and the third died while still in office. See
id. at 1401 n.166. It seems likely that the post-Board career moves of union-side appointees will
not differ substantially from their management-side counterparts.
119. Id. at 1401.
120. See id. at 1372 & n.43 (recounting arguments made by Albert Beeson and his Senate
supporters).
121. See id. at 1373-74 (discussing argument made by Senate supporter).
122. See id. at 1384 & nn.98-100.
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My own prior work offers possible support for this theory. In a
coauthored comprehensive study of appellate court cases reviewing
Board decisions between 1986 and 1993, Sara Schiavoni, Deborah
Merritt, and I found that judges with prior experience as
management-side attorneys were actually more likely to support
union legal positions in the courts of appeals than were their
counterparts.123 We suggested that such voting behavior might be due
to the "familiarity breeds respect" theory, especially given that the
NLRA's collectivist focus and its anticompetitive policy goals had by
the 1980s become increasingly anomalous in our individual rightsbased legal culture.'24 Alternatively, we observed that judges with
prior management-side experience might be "captured" by the Act
because the success of their own practice representing unionized
clients "depended to some extent on how energetically the Act was
enforced," encouraging these attorneys to develop "a more expansive
attitude toward the Act's protections [that] they then carried forward
as judges."'' 5
Still, even if former management lawyers with lifetime Article III
appointments may be more respectful of NLRA rules and priorities
when removed from a client-based mindset, it does not follow that
they would apply their knowledge and experience in a comparably
independent fashion during a brief stint at the NLRB. Attorneys who
represent employers are more apt to relinquish their background
partiality when career change is permanent than when they can
rationally anticipate resuming their management-side careers in a few
years' time.126 Moreover, a key aspect of the "familiarity breeds
respect" argument is that such familiarity is acquired within a
mainstream labor relations community that recognizes and respects
the advantages associated with collective bargaining. After 1980,
Republican appointments to the Board began to be drawn from a very
different segment of the management bar.

123. See James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1675, 1715, 1722, 1725, 1741 (1999).
124. See id. at 1742-48.
125. Id. at 1745 n.211.
126. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1382 n.91, 1398-1401 (arguing that partisan ties will trump
expertise in the short-term Board appointments setting, so that the public fails to reap the
benefit of members' experience as labor or management-side lawyers).
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Full Flowering-An Embrace of Union Avoidance

President Reagan in his Board appointments during the early
1980s departed dramatically from the approach taken by his
Reagan's initial nominees were not
Republican predecessors.
establishment-type management representatives with a basic
commitment to the NLRA's purposes and processes. Rather, they
were apostles for union avoidance, with professional backgrounds and
philosophies that questioned or challenged the agency's traditional
approach to applying the Act.127
The record of this Reagan Board reflected the sea change in its
composition. During the two year period from 1983-85, when the new
set of appointees formed a majority, the Board's pattern of decisions
changed remarkably from that of its recent predecessors. In the area
of unfair labor practice adjudication, the Nixon-Ford Board of 197576 and the Carter Board of 1979-80 each had upheld complaints filed
against employers about 84% of the time." By contrast, the Reagan
Board upheld only 52% of the nearly 800 unfair labor practice
complaints brought against employers -a decline of roughly two-fifths
in the General Counsel's success rate.1 29 The results were similarly
telling with respect to representation cases. The proportion of
representation decisions that supported the employer's position was
35% under the Nixon-Ford Board and 46% under the Carter Board,
but it soared to 69% in the 1983-85 period."3 The Reagan Board's
anti-union predisposition was manifested in a substantial number of
high-profile decisions, often overruling earlier Board doctrines, 3 ' and

127. See id. at 1384-85 (describing strong anti-union backgrounds of nominees Van De
Water, Dotson, and Hunter). See also Diane E. Schmidt, The PresidentialAppointment Process,
Task Environment Pressures,and Regional Office Case Processing, 48 POL. RES. Q. 381, 384-85
(1995) (discussing President Reagan's radical departure from presidential tradition of appointing
and reappointing Democrats and Republicans acceptable to both labor and business interests,
and effects of this radical change on Board's decision-making routines).
128. See Report on Dotson Board, supra note 10, at 7-8.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (overruling Alleluia Cushion Co.,
221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975) by adopting a restrictive approach to when individual employee conduct
is "concerted"); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985) (overruling Materials Research
Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982) by limiting Weingarten rights for non-union employees);
Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984) (overruling Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982) by
holding that Board lacked authority to issue a non-majority bargaining order); Milwaukee
Spring Division, Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (overruling Milwaukee Spring
Division, Illinois Coal Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) by allowing employers to relocate
during term of collective bargaining agreement without violating § 8(a)(5)).
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in the many routine cases in which the Board overlooked
employer
32
misconduct and frustrated the rights of employees.

Organized labor quickly perceived that the new breed of Reagan
appointees had elevated management perspectives to a different level.
The AFL-CIO announced publicly that it would cease adhering to its

traditional pursuit of nominees whose background did not identify
them as partisans of either camp.133 Observing that "[f]or the first
time, appointments to the NLRB have been of a character that

represents the perversion of that board into an instrument of antiunion employers," AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland made clear
that labor would henceforth seek the appointment of partisans
committed to the union cause."'
Although this decision to adopt an avowedly partisan approach to
Board membership may have stemmed from an understandable sense

of outrage, its implementation has further contributed to the
politicized atmosphere surrounding the Board. When President
Clinton was elected after twelve years of Republican control, his
Board appointments over eight years included three experienced
union-side attorneys.'35 Clinton's appointments also featured three

experienced management attorneys-indeed he was the first
Democratic President ever to appoint a management lawyer to the
NLRB. 36

The Clinton Board's early performance drew mixed

reactions from veteran Board watchers in the management bar.'37 The
business community directed some of its harshest criticism at the
Board's academic chair rather than his union-side colleagues, 38 but

132. See James Coppess & Sarah Fox, Decisions by the Dotson Board in Nonprecedentsetting Cases: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, in Report on Dotson Board,supra note 10,
at 27-36.
133. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1388-89 (discussing statements by AFL-CIO President
Lane Kirkland).
134. Id. (quoting from Kirkland press conference statement in June 1983).
135. See id. at 1394-95 (discussing appointments of Margaret Browning, Sarah Fox, and
Wilma Liebman).
136. See id. at 1394.
137. Compare Edward B. Miller, What Has the Gould Board Been Doing?, 47 LAB. L.J. 75
(1996) (observing that Board in first year had not swung as far to left as business community
might have expected) with Review of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce,
105h Cong. 61-99 (1997) (statement of G. Roger King, member, Society for Human Resource
Management (critical of Board's overreaching and pro-union bent). As an aside, King's
statement apparently misunderstands an article I authored (see note 85 supra) that had critically
analyzed appellate court reversals of Board efforts to fulfill the Act's purpose; King refers to the
article as a discussion of the Board's "erroneous and unlawful conduct." Id. at 65.
138. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, The Case of the Missing NLRB, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at 8
(reporting on rift between Chairman Gould and Justice Department over major antitrust/labor
case argued before Supreme Court); Arleen Goodman, The NLRB's Secret War on Small
Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, at A18 (attacking Gould's plan for "single site rule" that
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the Clinton Board ultimately was vilified by Republicans in Congress
as well as by anti-union segments of the employer community.'39

There is some evidence that voting by both union-side and
management-side Board members became more uniform and
predictable in the Clinton Board when compared to Board members'

voting patterns in earlier periods, although the evidence is drawn from
a relatively small number of split decisions (i.e., with at least one

dissenter)14 that may not represent the Board's overall voting

patterns.

0

D.

Politicizationin a Republican Era

The politicization of membership has taken a toll on the agency's
reputation as an adjudicative body. Board precedent has never been
as presumptively sacrosanct as judicial determinations, but rule of law
values obviously matter. The Board's overtly partisan composition
has invited both labor and management litigants to show less respect
for its prior decisions.14 ' In this regard, the current Bush Board has

been roundly criticized from within its own ranks for refusing to
examine the practical consequences of Clinton-era decisions before
overturning them, for failing to engage the arguments advanced in
dissenting opinions, and for overruling precedent without first seeking
input from the interested communities through amicus briefs. 42
The politicized nature of appointments also has undermined
confidence in the Board's ability to fulfill its mission. Both political
would allow union organizing on a site by site basis); Karen Alexander, Gould's Exit Produces
Rancor, Decisions, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at 18 (reporting on criticisms of Gould's tenure
by management-side observers and others).
139. See, e.g., 2000 House Hearing,supra note 10, at 2-3 (statement of Subcommittee Chair
Rep. John Boehner); Oversight of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 62-72 (1996) (statement of Daniel
V. Yager on behalf of Labor Policy Association).
140. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1405-12 (discussing two studies-one of Board member
votes in split decisions from 1985 to 2000 and the other of Board member votes from 1955 to
1979 involving cases that raise novel questions or create important precedents). As Professor
Flynn recognized, these two studies relied on quite different criteria for compiling datasets; see
id. at 1413-14. Moreover, a focus on split decisions, which comprise a small fraction of the total
number of cases decided each year, may produce results that differ from outcomes for the
dataset of all decisions. See Brudney, Schiavoni, & Merritt, supra note 123, at 1711-12, 1729-31,
1737-38 (explaining how the types of substantive issues addressed in split decisions may
contribute importantly to voting patterns that are more-or less-partisan than patterns for the
universe of all decisions).
141. See Dolin, supra note 1 (discussing Professor Samuel Estreicher's concern that
seemingly partisan reversals of precedent undermine respect for Board).
142. See Susan J. McGolrick, Members Schaumber, Liebman Discuss Differing Views on
Recent Board Decisions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at C-2 (March 3, 2005) (remarks of member
Liebman). See also Herzfeld, supra note 1 (reporting remarks of Professor Estreicher, critical of
Board's failure to explain or justify its recent departures from precedent).
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parties have contributed to an overtly partisan appointments process,

but the transformation has occurred during a period of Republican
ascendancy in national politics.143 In this setting, new voices have

emerged as dominant within the business community regarding the
desired composition and direction of the Board. As Professor Flynn

documents, it is the National Right to Work Committee more than the
Business Roundtable that now calls the shots on which nominations
succeed and sometimes which ones are made.1"

Thus, although

politicization is a long-simmering development at the Board, its
convergence with the domination of an increasingly conservative
Republican party has accelerated the changes occurring in national

labor policy as well as in the agency's reputation.
The trend toward polarization since 1980 has not been uniform. 45
Nonetheless, the Board's image has been shaped by its intense periods
of partisanship rather than the intervening moments of relative calm.
And the results of the Board's partisan decision-making have very

often undermined the rights and protections sought by those invoking
the Board's jurisdiction in the first place. An important consequence
has been organized labor's widespread disillusionment with the Board

as a possible source for protecting or vindicating statutory rights.
Many leading unions are now convinced that their best chances to
organize and bargain contracts lie in avoiding NLRB jurisdiction as
much as possible.'46 This set of union responses further contributes to
the perception of the Board as a tangential actor in the future of
workplace law and policy.

143. Since 1980, Republicans have controlled the Presidency more than two-thirds of the
time and the Senate more than three-fifths; Democrats have had control of both institutions in
only two of the past twenty-five years.
144. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1423-26. Professor Flynn suggests that the role of interest
groups in a more polarized Board appointments process is part of a larger trend in which
individual Senators, typically aligned with interest groups, have exercised far greater sway over
the traditional presumption in favor of the President's executive branch nominees. See id. at
1432-52. Although the Senate's committee structure and dispersed power centers may well be
easier for interest groups to manipulate if not control, Republican presidential administrations
since 1980 have been committed to union avoidance in a way that their predecessors from
Eisenhower to Nixon never were. That executive branch commitment helps account for the
politicized NLRB appointments process at least as much as the increasing role played by
individual Senators with less than deferential views.
145. From 1985 to 1992, the Reagan-Bush Board was chaired by a more moderate
Republican with a government background, James Stephens, and former government attorneys
constituted a majority for much of that seven year period. See Flynn, supra note 103, at 1424 &
nn.240-41 (discussing appointments of Johansen, Higgins, and Devaney, while suggesting that
these "status-quo-type individuals" retained most of the Dotson Board's decisions).
146. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text; Michelle Amber, Special Report: SEIU
Sees Record Growth: 64,000 New Members Organized in 1998, Lab. Rel. Week. (BNA) at 141921 (Dec. 23, 1999) (reporting that of 64,000 workers in newly SEIU-organized bargaining units,
less than 15,000 came through Board elections).
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One final byproduct of the politicized appointments process is
Congress's abandonment of any collective attention to Board
membership. Hearings on Board nominees were the norm from the
1950s through the mid 1980s, but such hearings have virtually
disappeared since 1985.14' Recess appointments were non-existent
from 1953 to the late 1970s, but have become almost standard in the
past twenty years.' 48 In addition, Board appointments now tend to
come in the form of packaged deals: the White House, interested
groups, and a small number of Senators on each side agree on a group
of union-side and management-side individuals who can then be
recess-appointed without objection or confirmed without senatorial
notice. 49 It may be that Congress's extended failure to revisit the
Act's substance eventually led to a corresponding lack of interest in
the individuals designated to administer or enforce that substance.
Alternatively, perhaps the preemptive influence exerted by a handful
of individual Senators is part of a more general phenomenon
involving decentralized control over executive branch nominations. 50
Whatever the explanation, the Senate's collective indifference to who
serves on the NLRB is one more illustration of the Board's isolated
status.

147. Sara Sampson, research librarian at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
searched the CIS index of congressional hearings using "National Labor Relations Board" and
"nomination" as subject descriptors and key words. The search results indicate that the Senate
held confirmation hearings for 27 of 38 Board appointments from 1953 to 1985, and that 6 of the
11 appointments without hearings were multi-term members who had at least one hearing. By
contrast, of 29 appointments since 1985, only 1 (Chairman William Gould in 1994) had a hearing.
148. No Board member was recess appointed between 1953 and 1977-all eighteen
appointments were formally nominated and confirmed by floor vote. Since 1977, Presidents
Carter, Reagan, and Bush each made two recess appointments, President Clinton made seven,
and the current President Bush has made four so far. See National Labor Relations Board
Members, http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/aboutlstructure/fbmembers.asp;
Digest of other White
House Announcements, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1662 (Dec. 23, 1982); Digest of Other
White House Announcements, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 883 (Aug. 17, 1981). These
figures include recess appointees who were later confirmed; multiple recess appointments of the
same individual are counted separately.
149. See Meisburg'sRecess Appointment Ends, While Walsh's Term Set to Expire Soon, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-1 (Dec. 13, 2004) (discussing standard practice of packaging
appointments in past two decades). See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 103, at 1429-30 (discussing initial
packaging of Board members Johansen and Babson in 1985, and members Devaney, Oviatt, and
Rogers in 1989); id. at 1430-32 (describing Clinton's package deal appointments in 1993-94 and
1997).
150. See generally id. at 1432-52 and sources cited therein.
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III. SOME BROADER PERSPECTIVES
A.

The ExtraordinaryDecline of Union Strength in the United States
The

previous

discussion

has

accounted

for

the

NLRB's

diminished status as primarily a function of developments within
government. By focusing on the agency's waning interactions with
and support from Congress and the federal courts, and on the
President's and Senate's newer approach to member qualifications, I
have downplayed events occurring outside the three branches. This

explanation is, of course, incomplete in important respects.

The

NLRB's status has been gradually transformed as its historical
constituencies -unions and employees seeking to unionize-have
precipitously declined in strength. The substantive reality of a weaker
labor movement has surely helped to marginalize the status of the
agency charged with protecting collective bargaining relationships.
From a comparative law standpoint, the decline of American
unions helps account for both the cause and effects of congressional
inaction over such a prolonged period. Organized labor has lost

strength and influence in most advanced industrial economies during
the past several decades.

These losses, however, have been less

dramatic in Canada and Britain than in the United States. 51 Union
density in Canada and Britain is not what it was in 1970, especially in
the private sector.'5 2 Still, organized labor's greater residual strength in
153
those countries, combined with its ties to the political party system,
have helped keep labor-management relations on the legislative
agenda even as that topic has faded from view in Congress.
Further, the efficiencies of parliamentary government, as well as
enhanced prospects for legislative innovation at the provincial level in

151. See Lyle Scruggs & Peter Lange, Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization,
Institutions, and Union Density, 64 J. POL. 126, 134 (2002) (reporting declines in union density
from 1974 to 1994 in United Kingdom (50.4% to 33.8%), Canada (31.3% to 30.8%) and United
States (24.2% to 13.9%); also Australia (47.5% to 35.0%)). Only in the United States did
decline approach 50%, and U.S. density by 1994 was between one-half and one-third that of the
other three countries.
152. See id. See also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & NOAH M. MELTZ, THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN UNIONISM 52 (2004) (reporting private sector union density in United States fell
from 29.1% in 1970 to 9.0% in 2001, while decline in Canada during same period was from
29.3% to 18.3%); Labour Market Trends (July 2002) p. 345 (U.K. private sector union density at
24% in 1993 and 19% in 2001).
153. See BOB HEPPLE & SANDRA FREDMAN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN 24 (2d. ed. 1992) (discussing close historical relationship between Labour
Party and affiliated trade unions); LIPSET & MELTZ, supra note 152, at 18 (discussing influence
of New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1990s in Ontario, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan). See
generally PAUL DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
238-525 (1993).
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Canada,154 have resulted in periodic policy changes being
accomplished in the legislative arena in both Britain and Canada."'
Unions have prevailed in some parliamentary contests and been
defeated in many others, but the definitive nature of these
engagements reflects that labor relations policy has developed
primarily through legislatures rather than agencies and courts. 56
Congress's inability or unwillingness to act since 1959 has left the
NLRB as the default channel for those seeking to affect labor
relations policy.
Notwithstanding the procedural obstacles that
characterize our system of divided government, one can readily
imagine that a stronger labor movement might have overcome
supermajority roadblocks to produce substantial legislative reform on
at least one or two occasions over nearly fifty years. Alternatively, a
more robust union presence could at least have negotiated
compromise packages of legislative adjustments with the business
community.
The effort to influence labor relations policy through the Board
appointments process has produced certain paradoxical effects.
Board membership has become increasingly politicized as both sides
strive for an edge in the de facto policymaking arena. The more
sharply partisan nature of Board reasoning has, in turn, led to cycles
of greater polarization in Board decisional outcomes, cycles that have
undermined the putative neutrality of the agency.
The Board as an institution-including the General Counsel's
office as well as career legal staff-has not been insensitive to these
developments.
Recognizing that the appointments process is
increasingly targeted from both sides by well-organized private
interests and partisan individual Senators, Board chairmen have at
times tried to make the agency less visible by navigating below the

154. See LIPSET & MELTZ, supra note 152, at 49 (noting that in Canada, only 10% of
employees are covered by federal legislation while 90% are covered by provincial laws; ratios in
United States are almost exactly the opposite-roughly 90% of employees covered by federal
legislation).
155. See, e.g., DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 153, at 366-76 (discussing Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act 1974); id. at 443-67 (discussing Employment Act 1980); id. at 483-89
(discussing Trade Union Act 1984); DOUGLAS G. GILBERT ET. AL. CANADIAN LABOUR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE U.S. PRACtiTIONER, 399-411 (2000) (describing range of
collective bargaining statutes in Canada's eleven provinces, enacted during 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s).
156. See Kevin M. Burkett, The Politicization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in
the 1990s, 6 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L. J. 161, 165-74 (1998) (discussing numerous legislative changes
in Ontario labor relations laws over several decades, and contrasting these developments with
legislative paralysis in United States); DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 153, at 1-5 (discussing
explosive rate of legislative change in British labor relations law from early 1960s to 1990s).
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radar of politically conscious inter-branch discourse. 5 7 One can thus
view the Board's reluctance to interact with the courts or Congress on
an express policymaking level-through formal rulemaking or
candidly explained non-acquiescence- as in part derived from a sense
that being isolated and marginal furthers agency self-preservation in
an adjudicatory capacity. And yet the Board's decisions become less
valued-because less neutral and also less predictable over the longterm-as Board members reflect more directly the policy-related
ambitions of those who control or influence their appointments.
A labor movement with greater clout would make periodic
recourse to Congress a more feasible policymaking option. Such
recourse might have dampened the tendency to view NLRB
adjudication as something other than a presumptively neutral effort to
interpret and enforce statutory meaning. A realistic prospect of
legislative change might also have led to the Board being better
prepared to develop policy interstitially through rulemaking, and to
engage the appellate courts more openly when pursuing its path of
non-acquiescence.
B.

The NLRB and other New Deal Agencies

The deterioration of a once-powerful labor movement does not,
however, fully account for the NLRB's present condition. Many of
the key choices made by the agency occurred in the early decades of
its existence, when it commanded greater attention and respect from
the courts as well as from a less polarized Congress. As discussed in
Part I, the Board never pursued a litigation strategy favoring the
implication of private rights of action.
Unlike its youthful
counterpart, the SEC, the NLRB during the 1940s and 1950s chose
not to invite the law's primary beneficiaries to join in shaping the
future direction of its regulatory regime. By declining to push for
judicial access rights on behalf of unions and employees, the Board
apparently viewed the status quo of exclusive control over
adjudication as preferable to the possibility that shared power might
yield richer or more dynamic policymaking options.
The Board's preference for adjudication over rulemaking and its
penchant for non-acquiescence also originated well before 1970, again

157. See, e.g., Kirk Victor, National Relations Board,27 THE NAT'L J. 1589 (June 19, 1993)
(discussing Chairman Stephens' role in lowering the intensity of attacks on the agency after the
Dotson era); Cindy Skrzycki, For NLRB, an Improvement in Its Own Relations, WASH. POST,
Dec. 25, 1998, at B-9 (discussing less combative tone associated with Chairman Truesdale
following the Gould era).
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during an era when the agency operated against a backdrop of
congressional attentiveness to and activism on labor-management
relations. Even after Congress shifted its focus to individual rights
approaches, the Board was in a position to launch serious efforts at
updating the applicability of its authorizing statute. The expansive
language of the NLRA has remained in place, establishing openended rights to engage in collective action and to secure
comprehensive relief for employer interference with those rights.'
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence celebrating deference to agency
judgments in general has enhanced the potential for agencies to
undertake policymaking initiatives.'59 Although the Board thus retains
considerable discretion to operate in a post-industrial era, it has
tended to rely on its internally driven practices for self-protection, not
to participate in a policy dialogue. To be sure, the Board over time
may justifiably have come to fear the wrath of a Congress and
judiciary less amenable to union influence. Nonetheless, the agency's
insular approach has ended up making it increasingly irrelevant in
efforts to maintain or renew commitments to collective action in the
workplace setting.
The NLRB's current marginal position differs sharply from the
more vibrant and relevant role played in recent decades by other New
Deal era agencies such as the SEC and the FCC. There are many
complex reasons for the divergence, and a full discussion is beyond
the scope of this article. One important factor, discussed earlier, is
that Congress has regularly revisited the jurisdiction of the SEC and
FCC, revising and expanding agency powers and responsibilities."6
Two additional factors, set forth briefly here, may also help explain
why these agencies have retained greater authority and stature than
the Board.
First, the SEC and FCC each view it as their basic mission to
protect a dispersed and unorganized public-the interest of investors
who depend on accurate information and the integrity of the securities
markets,' and the interest of consumers who require efficient, costeffective, and nondiscriminatory access to televisions, telephones, and

158. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 160(c); Estlund, supra note 36, at 1608-10.
159. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
160. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (describing necessity for federal regulation to protect public
interest under 1934 Securities Exchange Act); see generally The Investor's Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integrity, http://www.sec.gov/aboutd
whatwedo.shtml.
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other communication services. 162 Because there exists a broad-based
understanding that both agencies do operate to serve the public
interest, a rough consensus has developed on the need for an evolving
regulatory presence. This consensus is apt to be felt most strongly
during periodic crises that affect public confidence in the operation of
the securities markets or of basic communication services.163
By contrast, the NLRB's role appears more akin to that of a
traffic cop, monitoring interactions between two identified
In overseeing relations between unions and
constituencies.
management in the private sector, the Board is charged with
protecting employee free choice and encouraging collective
bargaining in order to further the larger goal of securing and

maintaining industrial peace."6 But that connection to the interest of
the public generally seems somewhat attenuated, and it has become
even more so as destabilizing conflicts between labor and

management are no longer familiar features of our national economic
landscape. 6 5
Second, and relatedly, the SEC and FCC seek to promote the

interest of their respective consuming publics while overseeing
multiple disparate constituencies within the business cormunity.
Apart from auditing and regulating the disclosure practices of publicly

traded companies, the SEC monitors the activities of other key
162. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 (authorizing FCC to exercise broad powers and duties "as
public convenience, interest, or necessity requires") See generally The FCC History Project,
http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history. See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-216 (1943)
(describing Act as making FCC more than simply a traffic supervisor; it also has "the burden of
determining the composition of that traffic"). Whether the FCC has effectively fulfilled this
mission is open to question in a number of areas, perhaps most notably television broadcasting
and-until recent decades-telephone regulation as well. See generally STANLEY M. BESEN ET.
AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 1-2, 4-19 (1984); STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET. AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 605-823 (2001).

163. One recent example involves the SEC's aggressive regulatory approach from 2003-05
under Bush-appointed Chairman William Donaldson in the wake of the Enron scandal and
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See, e.g., John Cranford, Lightning Rod on Wall Street,
CQ WKLY. 1430-38 (May 30, 2005); Deborah Solomon, Tough Tack of SEC Chief Could Relent,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at Cl, C5. Another illustration is the FCC's response to public
dissatisfaction with violence on television, by imposing a ratings system compatible with the
congressionally mandated V-chip and by requiring child-friendly programming. See generally
Edmund L. Andrews, Communications Bill Signed, And the Battles Begin Anew, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1996, at Al; Commercial TV Gets Passing Grade in New Annenberg Study, COMM.
DAILY, June 29, 1999, at 4; Alan Breznick, Kids' TV Issues Dominate D.C. Landscape, CABLE
WORLD, July 5, 1999, at 40.
164. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (setting forth national labor relations policy). See generally About
the NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/default.asp. It is noteworthy that the NLRB in its
Web site overview description never refers to the public interest.
165. See, e.g., Fehmida Sleemi, 1997 Work Stoppages, COMPENSATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS 50 (Summer 1998) (reporting annual major work stoppage data, indicating that
strikes involving 1000 workers or more declined from 289 per year during 1970s to 114 per year
in 1980-84, 52 per year in 1985-89, and 37 per year in 1990-97).
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players in the securities world, such as investment advisors,
166
accountants, broker-dealers, mutual funds, and stock exchanges.
Similarly, the FCC regulates participation in communications markets
by firms or sectors with divergent if not conflicting interests. These
entities include radio broadcasting licensees, television and cable
television operators, satellite communication companies, the
producers of long-distance, local, and cellular telephone services, and
firms providing Internet access; there is also the recurring importance
of overseeing interconnection and cost-sharing among all these service
providers. 167 Given the presence of such distinct and at times
competing business perspectives, policy debates about the importance
of agency regulations or enforcement tend to be less polarized and
starkly partisan than is the case with respect to debates about the need
to protect employees or unions from overreaching by management.
To take just one example, the SEC's recent regulatory and
enforcement initiatives have separately targeted inter alia mutual
funds, securities markets, corporate management, accountants, and inhouse lawyers as part of the agency's campaign to rebuild public
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets."6 The agency has
undertaken these initiatives based in part on new congressional
directives and increased federal funds for regulation and
enforcement. 69 To be sure, the SEC's reputation is not without
controversy; in recent decades it has been criticized both for tilting too
far toward hyperactivity and for sinking into lethargy in its regulatory
approach. 7 ° Still, the agency remains a serious player in articulating
and defending the interest of the investing public, as part of an
ongoing policy debate that includes businesses with distinct
166. See, e.g., Cranford, supra note 163; Harvey L. Pitt, Regulation of the Accounting
Profession (Jan. 17, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch535.htm.
See generally The
Investor's Advocate, supra note 161.
167. See generally BENJAMIN ET. AL., supra note 162, at 35-54, 380-91, 541-44, 623-42, 82526 (2001); FCC History Project, supra note 162; Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications
Regulation: An Introduction 4-12 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Nov.
2003).
168. See John Gibeaut, Back in Business, A.B.A. J. 41 (May 2005); Cranford, supra note 163;
Solomon, supra note 163; Tamara Loomis, SEC Gores GC in Sarbanes-Oxley Dust-Up, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at 18.
169. See Solomon, supra note 163, at C1 (discussing impact of Sarbanes-Oxley law on SEC
activities); Gibeaut, supra note 168, at 43 (describing impact of substantially increased SEC
budget on agency staffing and enforcement).
170. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 909, 937-49 (1994)
(criticizing agency as hyperactive during period of Republican presidential control in early
1990s); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 349-556, 56977 (revised ed. 1995) (analyzing agency performance as at times overly cautious and passive
under Republican and Democratic administrations).
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perspectives on how their regulated markets should be structured.
That role contrasts notably with an NLRB that has generally adopted
a low-profile approach, eschewing assertions about the public interest
in the face of an increasingly polarized interest group disagreement as
to the value of unions and collective bargaining in the labor market.
CONCLUSION

In the end, the diminished status of unions is linked to important
factors besides the inadequacies of the legal regime: globalization of
product and labor markets, insufficient energy or imagination within
the labor movement, and the unusually fierce opposition of the U.S.
business community all have played prominent roles. Indeed, as
union strength has ebbed, management interests have become even
more militant in their hostility to the existence of the collectively
bargained arrangements the statute is meant to foster. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts have
responded more supportively to management's perspective.171
Those sympathetic to the Act and its purposes seem largely
resigned to the persistence of Board stagnation. They maintain in
effect that given its long tradition of ad hoc decision-making, the
Board is a permanent victim of how history has developed. Before
legislative gridlock and member politicization really set in, the agency
might have used its more respected position (and Congress's then less
polarized status), to invite and even initiate discussion as to how the
Act could best be updated amidst changing economic circumstances.
But that window of opportunity has long since closed. Now the most
the Board can do is engage in de facto interstitial policymaking
through adjudication. Anything bolder would be deeply wounding if
not suicidal.
Part of me accepts that somber conclusion. But another part of
me wonders about the inevitability of the downward spin into
irrelevancy that now grips the agency. At a minimum, it may be worth
exploring whether the NLRB's adjudicatory function can be made less
partisan. In Britain, administrative tribunals that adjudicate a wide
range of statutory disputes concerning individual employeesincluding charges of discrimination or unfair dismissal for
participating in trade union activities-are typically comprised of a
presiding judge plus two lay members who serve part-time and are

171. See supra notes 91, 92, 97-100 and sources cited therein. See generally Brudney, supra
note 40, at 1572-88.
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appointed from qualified lists submitted by employer and employee

organizations. i 2 Similarly, the agency charged with adjudicating trade
union applications for statutory recognition, and with resolving
disputes about information disclosure during the collective bargaining
process, operates through three-person panels consisting of a
government chair plus two lay members appointed from lists of
individuals experienced as representatives of employers or workers.'73

These tribunals have not been above criticism,'74 but in their
appointment, training, and retention of lay members, they have
managed to avoid the extreme partisanship and politicization that
have afflicted the NLRB. 7 '

Beyond this prospect, one need not throw caution to the wind to
conclude that the Board should confront the importance of making
internal reforms. These may well include trying for more rulemaking,
inviting academics and others to submit studies of where the Act

succeeds or fails (or acknowledging that such studies already exist and
referring to them), and seeking to generate solutions that make the
Act more relevant to post-industrial workplaces, especially the
challenges borne by workers who want to organize and engage in
collective bargaining. Such efforts may well trigger some political

recriminations, at least in the short term. But those responses seem
preferable to watching this once-respected and still-talented group of

agency professionals continue to have their status battered while
clinging to the status quo.
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